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The Multilateral Human Rights System: 
Systemic Challenge or Healthy Contestation? 
JOLYON FORD†  
I. INTRODUCTION 
The United Nations Human Rights Council (‘the Council’) is the 
peak global institution of the existing multilateral legal order on the 
promotion and protection of fundamental human rights. On June 19, 
2018 the Trump administration announced that it would withdraw the 
United States’ membership of the Council.1 A year previously, 
relatively early in the Trump presidency, the administration had 
clearly signaled in the Council that it saw future US participation in 
that forum as potentially contingent upon certain reforms to the 
Council’s membership and agenda.2 Nevertheless, the June 2018 
announcement came the day after the UN High Commissioner for 
Human Rights had made statements in Geneva, in a formal yearly-
review speech to the Council, highly critical of US immigration 
detention policy in respect of its southern border (forced separation of 
children from undocumented arrival parents).3 Consequently, while 
the withdrawal announcement ostensibly related to foreign policy 
 
© 2020 Jolyon Ford. 
†  Associate Professor, School of Law, Australian National University. 
 1.  Michael Pompeo & Nikki Haley, Remarks on the UN Council (June 18, 2018) 
(transcript available at https://usun.usmission.gov/remarks-on-the-un-human-rights-
council/). 
 2.  Amb. Nikki Haley, Address to UN Human Rights Council (June 6, 2017) (transcript 
available at https://geneva.usmission.gov/2017/06/06/ambassador-nikki-haley-address-to-
the-u-n-human-rights-council). 
 3.  Zeid Ra’ad al Hussein (UN High Commissioner for Human Rights), ‘Opening 
Statement and Global Update of Human Rights Concerns’ UN Human Rights Council, 38th 
Session, Geneva, 18 June 2018, 
https://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/HRC/Pages/NewsDetail.aspx?NewsID=23206&LangI
D=E.   
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matters,4 some responses to the announcement explicitly emphasized 
its timing and so implicitly, on one reading, linked the withdrawal to 
political tactics in the context of intense immigration policy debate 
within domestic US politics.5 
This essay explores some of the parameters and merits of a 
putative argument that the announcement of June 19, 2018 might 
most properly be understood as but one manifestation of a wider 
political backlash within the US (and indeed other Western 
democracies)6 against the multilateral human rights system 
epitomized by the Council. That line of argument—and the nature, 
validity and utility of the ‘backlash’ characterization or concept in 
international law and international relations more generally—were 
partly the subject of a Fall 2019 symposium to which this essay 
relates.7 
There are two prongs to this argument, stylized here for sake of 
analysis. First, populist-nationalist political sentiment at home 
simultaneously fuels and is fanned by strident high-profile diplomatic 
critiques (or even rejections) of global bodies such as the Council.8 
Seen this way, the Trump administration’s withdrawal from the 
Council, in the temporal context of criticism of its immigration 
policy, would appear to sustain a viable narrative of populist backlash 
against a key institution of global governance. Second, so the 
argument would run, the nature and force of this backlash constitutes 
a systemic threat to the future of the post-1945 rules-based 
international order, especially since it comes mostly from the 
 
 4.  See supra note 2.  
 5.  Jean Galbraith, Contemporary Practice of the United States Relating to 
International Law, 112 AM. J. INT’L L. 734, 745-46 (2018) (see for example the title of the 
piece ‘United States Withdraws from the UN Human Rights Council, Shortly After 
Receiving Criticism about its Border Policy’). 
 6.  This essay focuses on the U.S. in this context, since some other perceived 
challenges to the multilateral human rights system from other powerful states (such as China 
or Russia) are more obviously the continuation of longer-term trends, whereas Western 
democracies had hitherto largely supported that system (subject to the observations below 
that US ambivalence towards engagement with the UN human rights system is neither 
unanticipated nor necessarily new). This is an aside by the author. 
 7.  See ‘The Populist Challenge to the International Legal Order’ Symposium, 
University of Maryland, 18 October 2019, 
https://digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/mjil_symposia/2019/; See also Mark Copelovitch 
& Jon C. W. Pevehouse, International Organizations in a New Era of Populist Nationalism, 
14 REV. INT’L ORG. 169 (2019). 
 8.  An attempt to define ‘populism’ is beyond the scope of this essay. For one 
overview: See Cristóbal Rovira Kaltwasser, et al., The Oxford Handbook of 
Populism (Oxford University Press, 2017); see also Copelovitch & Pevehouse, supra note 6, 
at 170-75. 
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superpower whose values-based rhetoric and leadership has perhaps 
done most to advance the global human rights agenda in the modern 
era. One can certainly debate whether this is an accurate account of 
the US human rights record abroad. However, the influence of this 
portrayal of the US as a global human rights champion along with the 
practical importance of US funding to such bodies explains the 
perceived significance of the US pulling out altogether from a peak 
institution, and so explains the search for ways to try to understand 
the move’s implications. 
Part II of this essay offers three ways to frame the June 2018 US 
announcement and subsequent withdrawal, from the perspective of 
the international legal order for the governance of human rights: (i) as 
above, as a new and systemic and potentially irreversible backlash 
connoting a possible existential disengagement crisis for this order; 
(ii) as a robust and notable but neither wholly novel nor systemically-
significant development in a rules-based order that continues to 
muddle through; and (iii) as contestation and engagement that might 
be framed as potentially healthy for the future of the state-based 
global human rights system and its universalizing ‘project’. 
These framings relate to some different arguable ways to 
approach or interpret this action, rather than either (a) analysis of the 
conceivable domestic political or other drivers or motivators of that 
action, or (b) analysis of the intended or the actual effects or impacts 
of the withdrawal action on the institutional governance of human 
rights at the international / multilateral level. Yet, given the 
availability and objective relevance of these other ways of analyzing 
the 2018 withdrawal, Part III’s discussion advances a number of 
qualifying or contextualizing observations about the three framings 
advanced here. The significance and complexity of those 
observations illustrate why this brief essay’s ambitions must be 
limited. It attempts to scope, in a preliminary way, some aspects of a 
future research agenda around the content, empirical basis, and/or 
utility of the ‘backlash’ motif in relation to human rights governance 
at the international level. 
Before proceeding, at least two possible broader perspectives 
(that is, broader than the human rights context) might be said to flow 
from the 2018 US withdrawal from the Council. One is that this 
might represent a much wider disengagement on the part of the US, 
beyond just the human rights sphere, from the paradigmatic 
institutions of global and multilateral governance on a whole range of 
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subject-matters.9 Another possible and indeed compatible perspective 
would see the Council withdrawal as indicative of a broader global 
trend of disengagement by many states from international 
institutions, that is, one limited neither to the US nor to the human 
rights institutional context.10 
A full treatment of such perspectives lies well beyond the scope 
of this essay, which focuses on whether the stylized ‘backlash’ 
concept above is workable as a frame for examining US 
(dis)engagement with the Council and the constellation of related UN 
human rights institutions. Still, those broader perspectives are, on one 
level, somewhat inescapable. This is because the underlying genesis 
of or motivation for this essay was, in part, an interest in exploring 
whether the June 2018 withdrawal is best understood—from an 
international lawyer’s perspective, rather than a scholar of US 
political dynamics—as a narrow action (the significance of which is 
restricted to the particular perceived institutional governance 
problems within the Council), or as possibly representing some far 
wider dynamic (a broader US turn away from leading or even 
engaging with the rules-based international legal order more 
generally). This wider possibility potentially arises because the late 
20th / early 21st century emergence into global significance of the 
institutions and discourse of human rights might be viewed as one 
metaphor or example of the ‘globalization’ meta-trend itself. If so, 
any ‘backlash’ against the multilateral human rights system might be 
capable of being characterized as illustrating and/or being driven by a 
far more general and profound reaction to and rejection of globalized 
governance institutions and approaches well beyond human rights. 
II. FRAMING ANY US ‘BACKLASH’ AGAINST THE GLOBAL HUMAN 
RIGHTS SYSTEM 
What follows are three non-exhaustive ways briefly to frame the 
event or announcement under consideration in terms of what it might 
represent—in a forward-looking rather than empirical or diagnostic 
sense—about US engagement with the international human rights 
 
 9.  Caroline Fehl & Johannes Thimm, Dispensing with the Indespensable Nation?, 25 
GLOB. GOVERNANCE 23, 24 (2019); see also Ionut Popescu, American Grand Strategy and 
the Rise of Offensive Realism, 134 POL. SCI. Q. 375, 376 (2019). 
 10.  Catherine M. Brölmann et al., Exiting International Organizations, 15 INT’L ORG. 
L. REV. 243, 256 (2018); see also Inken von Borzyskowski & Felicity Vabulas, Hello, 
Goodbye: When do States Withdraw from International Organizations?, 14 REV. INT’L ORG. 
169 (2019). 
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architecture in the current era and the consequences for that system.11 
The focus is not on how the 2018 withdrawal might be approached 
from the perspective of party or other politics in the US domestic 
context. 
‘Negative: Systemic Threat’ 
The introduction above outlines the thrust of this potential way 
to frame what June 2018 represents. It is captured in the materials 
introducing the Fall 2019 Symposium (referred to above), which 
stated that the “continued success [in the West] of populist ideas” and 
populism’s “deep skepticism of international law and institutions” 
poses “an urgent challenge” and indeed a “threat” to the global legal 
order.12 On this approach, the US withdrawal constitutes ‘backlash’ 
conduct that cannot be characterized as mere critique of or discontent 
with an institution or status quo, but instead represents “fundamental 
resistance to and rejection of a system or institution of law” including 
“aggressive steps to resist the system and to remove its legal force.”13 
The US posture on the Council is, viewed this way, a systemic 
rejection intended to deprive the multilateral system of its legal and 
political force and effect, and with possible serious and significant 
system-wide implications and effects. 
‘Neutral: Business as Usual’ 
An alternative possible lens would yield a far less dramatic 
diagnosis in terms of the future prospects of the international human 
rights system. This lens would discern largely continuity rather than 
change in US posture to participation in the Council, on which it has 
long been ambivalent, and/or see the withdrawal as a particularly 
robust but not entirely atypical form of systemic engagement and 
contestation. This robust contestation is (on this view) endemic and 
inevitable in something as inherently deeply political as a global body 
on human rights standards, but is a form of engagement on human 
rights and does not necessarily represent a threat to the future 
 
 11.  For one framing exercise on the perceived backlash against international 
adjudication and state withdrawals from international dispute settlement mechanisms: See 
Joost Pauwelyn & Rebecca J. Hamilton, Exit from International Tribunals, 9 J. INT’L DISP. 
SETTLEMENT 679, 686 (positing five different outcomes from withdrawal or threatened 
withdrawal). 
 12.  MARYLAND CAREY LAW, supra note 8. 
 13.  See David Caron & Esm. . . Shirlow, Dissecting Backlash: The Unarticulated 
Causes of Backlash and its Unitended Consequences, in THE JUDICIALIZATION OF 
INTERNATIONAL LAW: A MIXED BLESSING?, 160 (Andreas Follesdal & Geir Ulfstein eds., 
2018) (drawing on Cass R. Sunstein, Backlash’s Travels, 42 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 435 
(2007)). 
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existence of the Council or the wider order it sits atop. 
‘Positive: Reform Opportunity’ 
Through a further alternative framing, what some might 
characterize as system-threatening ‘backlash’ behaviors are instead 
best understood as navigable and necessary challenges to a deeply 
flawed but otherwise resilient and adaptive system. These challenges 
were, on this approach, necessary for the system’s legitimacy and 
effectiveness and may serve to stimulate international institutions, or 
at least the underlying human rights agenda that they relate to, in 
unforeseen beneficial ways (in terms of net objective progress on 
progressive realization of universal enjoyment of human rights). 
III. EXPLORING CHARACTERISATIONS OF THE 2018 US WITHDRAWAL 
In the June 19, 2018 press conference announcing and 
explaining the withdrawal decision, US Secretary of State Michael 
Pompeo stated that the Council had become, from the 
administration’s perspective, “an exercise in shameless hypocrisy” 
with “some of the world’s most serious [human rights] offenders 
sitting on the Council itself.”14 The US Ambassador to the UN Nikki 
Haley added that the Council had become “a protector of human 
rights abusers and a cesspool of political bias” particularly in terms of 
“chronic bias against Israel.”15 Mainstream media coverage tended to 
emphasize the anti-Israel bias dimension,16 and/or draw links to 
immigration policy,17 although in terms the June 19 announcement 
focused largely on the membership issue and did not, as such, 
mention the previous day’s criticism in the Council of the 
 
 14.  POMPEO & HALEY, supra note 6.   
 15.  Id. 
 16.  See Carol Morello, U.S. Withdraws from U.N. Human Rights Council Over 
Perceived Bias Against Israel, THE WASHINGTON POST (June 19, 2018 5:59 PM), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/us-expected-to-back-away-from-
un-human-rights-council/2018/06/19/a49c2d0c-733c-11e8-b4b7-308400242c2e_story.html?; 
see also Gardiner Harris, Trump Administration Withdraws U.S. from U.N. Human Rights 
Council, NEW YORK TIMES (June 19, 2018), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/19/us/politics/trump-israel-palestinians-human-
rights.html. 
 17.  See Sara Silverstein, The Price of America’s Withdrawal from the U.N. Human 
Rights Council: Ignoring Human Rights for Migrants Could Mean that Civil Rights Are 
Next, THE WASHINGTON POST (July 19, 2018 6:00 AM), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/made-by-history/wp/2018/07/19/the-price-of-
americas-withdrawal-from-the-u-n-human-rights-council/. 
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administration’s border control policy.18 
1.  No system-threat backlash (Framing A)? 
Politics scholars might conceivably seek to argue that the 
administration’s action is best explained by, for instance, sensitivity 
to criticism of its immigration detention policies, or by reference to 
any related domestic political gains that might be had from attacking 
and withdrawing from a UN body. The backlash against the Council 
might perhaps be characterized as ‘populist’ in the sense outlined 
above,19 for instance in that it is calculated—whatever the 
‘consensus’ or objective long-term national interest—to appeal 
politically to a nationalistic in-group nostalgic for a past when states 
were independent of criticisms framed in terms of international 
human rights law or at least immune from the related multilateral 
architectures and diplomacy of human rights.20 Yet, this essay’s 
perspective is one of international law, not US political science. From 
this perspective, one’s intuitions as a human rights scholar might well 
be that the US withdrawal was a cynical play to domestic political 
audiences that risks damaging the global human rights agenda. Yet 
for the reasons now outlined it is difficult to portray the decision as 
representing a Type ‘A’ (above) systemic threat. 
Official statements matter to international law in that under 
certain conditions they help to comprise the normative content of this 
legal system. In a joint statement, Secretary of State Michael Pompeo 
and Ambassador to the U.N. Nikki Haley, stated that the US “has no 
opposition in principle to multilateral bodies working to protect 
human rights [emphasis added]”, a “critical objective that reflects 
America’s commitment to freedom.”21 They stated that the US did 
not intend a retreat from human rights commitments, but “on the 
contrary … our commitment does not allow us to remain a part of a 
hypocritical and self-serving organization that makes a mockery of 
human rights.”22 On its terms, this was an official expression of 
 
 18.  See Nahal Toosi, US Quits UN Human Rights Council, POLITICO (June 19, 2018 
6:56 PM CET), https://www.politico.eu/article/human-rights-council-united-states-donald-
trump-expected-to-withdraw/; see supra note 2 (the announcement did note that the US 
would “not take lectures from hypocritical bodies”, which might be understood as a 
reference to the 18 June speech in the Council). 
 19.  See supra note 12. 
 20.  Ted Piccone, U.S. Withdrawal from U.N. Human Rights Council is “America 
Alone”, Brookings (June 20, 2018), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-
chaos/2018/06/20/u-s-withdrawal-from-u-n-human-rights-council-is-america-alone/. 
 21.  See supra note 1. 
 22.  Id. 
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commitment to human rights, and not (as in Type ‘A” backlash, 
above) an act of “fundamental resistance to and rejection of” that 
system of law.23 The June 19th announcement chronicled the US 
initiatives in and around the Council over 2017-2018, which was said 
by the administration to comprise “good-faith” efforts towards 
“major, dramatic, systemic changes” to reform the Council’s 
membership and agenda-setting procedures to address problems as 
perceived by the US as a Council member.24 The announcement 
noted that the US would “keep trying to strengthen the entire 
framework of the UN engagement on human rights issues”.25 While, 
of course, such official statements might conceivably be shown to be 
disingenuous, the withdrawal announcement on its terms does not 
smack of a fundamental rejection of the human rights system. For one 
thing, the US was withdrawing its membership, not denying the 
existence or relevance of a global legal order.26 This is not necessarily 
to defend the administration’s approach but is merely to question 
whether this particular event is susceptible to characterization as a 
“threat to the global legal order.”27 To argue that, one might have to 
argue that the Council and the global human rights system are 
synonymous, such that rejection of one involves rejection of the 
other; on one view, the US rejected membership of a particular 
institution, an architecture or artefact of human rights, not the 
normative framework thereof. 
The Type ‘A’ framing of ‘systemic threat’ may also not be an 
appropriate approach because while US leadership and institutional 
funding still matters (i.e. has impact) in global governance, US 
disengagement from the Council may not in fact fundamentally 
undermine or disable that institution or deprive it of force in global 
affairs. There are three possible angles to this. First, the US is only 
one member state and its participation or even financing may not be 
‘indispensable’28 to the Council as a flawed but viable and now 
continuing part of the international legal and diplomatic system. 
Second, the Sunstein ‘backlash’ narrative29 to some extent assumes 
that an irreplaceable global values leader has abandoned the human 
 
 23.  See supra note 12. 
 24.  See Haley, supra note 3. 
 25.  Id. 
 26.  Moreover, by withdrawing Council membership alone the US is not, did not in 
terms, and is not necessarily legally able to simply absolve itself of human rights obligations 
adhering to it in international law. 
 27.  See MARYLAND CAREY LAW, supra note 8.  
 28.  See Fehl & Thimm, supra note 10. 
 29.  See Caron & Shirlow, supra note 14. 
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rights cause, with fatal consequences for that system. Yet since at 
least the 2003 invasion of Iraq and subsequent events, it is hardly 
obvious that the US has been highly influential or widely admired for 
its human rights record abroad. This US credibility deficit means that 
it does not follow necessarily that its Council withdrawal has or will 
cause other states to collapse in dismay and discouragement and 
themselves give up on the human rights cause. Third, a Type ‘A’ 
framing would perhaps assume that a powerful player has cut down a 
vital institution in its prime (so to speak). Yet the Council is routinely 
criticized by reputable pro-human rights activists for its many 
imperfections and failings.30 In that sense, it is not obvious that the 
US withdrawal has fundamentally undermined (i.e. in a Type ‘A’ 
system-threatening way) what stature, influence or efficacy the 
Council might have enjoyed hitherto, precisely because the Council’s 
credibility was not particularly high. For one thing, it was not 
necessarily viewed as having resolved the many criticisms of its 
predecessor UN institution.31 A far more troubling scenario might be 
if the US was a credible and universally admired human rights 
champion that withdrew from (and withdrew support from) a 
flourishing institution that represented the epitome of a universal 
values-based community under law. Yet in that scenario the 
institution might well continue to operate well, in part because of the 
limits to US indispensability and to post-Iraq US credibility on 
international law (and human rights) outlined above. One might 
qualify this wider point. This is because human rights advocates 
critical of the Council might argue that principled participation 
therein and the maintenance of symbolic rhetorical support for such 
institutions still has value to the human rights project notwithstanding 
the Council’s problems.32 Yet such a debate is no longer about 
existential threat to a global normative system but about differing 
 
 30.  See Strengthening the UN Human Rights Council from the Ground Up, HUMAN 
RIGHTS WATCH (April 23, 2018, 4:00 AM), 
https://www.hrw.org/news/2018/04/23/strengthening-un-human-rights-council-ground 
(discussing the position taken by leading transnational human rights non-governmental 
organizations not long before the June 2018 withdrawal).  Some concerns expressed there 
are in practically identical terms to the concerns outlined in the June 19, 2018 withdrawal 
announcement.  Haley supra note 2.  For example, the “erosion of the Council’s credibility 
when States responsible for gross and systematic rights violations are elected as members”. 
 31.  See Adam S. Chilton and Robert Golan-Vilella, Did the Creation of the United 
Nations Human Rights Council Produce a Better “Jury”?, 58 HARV. J. INT’L. L. 7 (2016). 
 32.  See Hilary Charlesworth & Emma Larking, Introduction: The Regulatory Power of 
the Universal Periodic Review, in HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE UNIVERSAL PERIODIC REVIEW: 
RIGHTS AND RITUALISM (Cambridge University Press, 2014), for a powerful scholarly 
critique of a principal Council process that nevertheless notes the value of maintaining that 
process. 
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strategies for how, in institutional terms, best to give effect to the 
values and principles of that system. 
Perhaps the only argument that Type ‘A’ ‘backlash’ proponents 
might have, then, is that by its symbolic exit (and more practically, its 
financial one), the US has irreparably and in a system-threatening 
way weakened the Council, or even the wider rules-based human 
rights order. Another version of this argument might be that the 
Council withdrawal cannot be seen in isolation from other US 
diplomatic conduct in international legal and institutional fields well 
beyond the human rights context, the cumulative effect of which is to 
threaten the very idea of the Rule of Law at the global level whether 
or not one is talking just in terms of human rights. I develop this idea 
below, but on both counts it is not glib to state that it is probably too 
soon to know. 
2 . ‘Silver lining’ analysis (Framing C)? 
In co-announcing the withdrawal, US Ambassador Nikki Haley 
stated that the US would “continue to lead on human rights outside 
the misnamed Human Rights Council”, keep trying to strengthen the 
entire UN human rights framework, and “continue to strongly 
advocate for reform” of the Council, upon which “we would be 
happy to re-join it.”33 Again, one need not be an apologist for any 
particular administration to observe that one way to frame the US 
action is not as a systemic threat, but as a catalyst and opportunity for 
reform. This is precisely so that the international human rights system 
(whether or not manifesting in this sort of Council or that) might 
more effectively and legitimately advance human rights respect, 
protection and remediation by states and others. Above, it was argued 
that one reason that the US withdrawal might not be system-
threatening is that the reputation, and expectations, of the Council 
were not very high. 
Framing ‘C’ is thus the perspective—perhaps somewhat 
counter-intuitive for human rights advocates otherwise mostly critical 
of the US withdrawal—that the real threat to the UN human rights 
system was continuation of the status quo. Again, this is not to take 
the administration’s word for it in terms of the Council’s deep 
problems. It is because highly credible human rights scholars have 
portrayed the statist international human rights system (and the 
Council in particular) as, in part, an elaborate ritualistic set of 
rhetorical reporting and other performances often with little practical 
 
 33.  See Haley, supra note 2. 
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significance for victims, participation in which serves to distance and 
insulate states from their responsibilities even as they reiterate their 
commitment to fulfil these.34 
On this narrative, if the system was to survive or certainly to 
flourish it needed and needs revitalization or reconfiguration, even 
very robust contestation and questioning of its legitimacy or 
effectiveness might only be productive. Again, it is probably too soon 
to say if the US action has had this stimulus effect. Yet the Trump 
administration’s ‘backlash’ against the Council might trigger a degree 
of ‘pushback’ that invigorates the system globally, rather than the 
contrary. Alternatively, unless institutions and systems never change, 
a positive framing would see acts that are the possible incipient 
elements of a new international human rights system, not necessarily 
acts undermining an existing system. In his 2018 essay ‘The 
Pushback against the Populist Challenge’, Kenneth Roth—the 
Director of Human Rights Watch—argued that a fair assessment of 
the global prospects for human rights should ‘induce concern rather 
than surrender’, a ‘call to action rather than a cry of despair’.35 If 
empirically we have witnessed a ‘backlash’ against the human rights 
system by some Western states, we must also examine—insofar as 
this is possible—the empirical case for a corresponding ‘pushback’ 
(by some states, or some actors within the ‘backlash’ states) in 
support of this values-laden part of the rules-based international 
order. Yet where we then find ourselves debating ‘pushback’ against 
‘backlash’—and especially if we discern in empirical terms a 
reciprocal pattern (or even cycle) of ‘backlash’ and ‘pushback’—we 
must ask if we are merely in a particularly challenging but non-
systemic period of intense contestation, rather than existential 
systemic survival. Of course, we could see ‘fundamental resistance’ 
to law that is system-threatening in its intent, but not in its effect. We 
could call that unsuccessful or attempted Type ‘A’ backlash. This 
brings us to the other framing outlined. 
3.  Continuity not Change (Framing B)? 
Focus on the withdrawal event may convey a ‘shock’ factor that 
obscures the possibility that this particular action is better viewed as 
exhibiting a degree of continuity rather than an outright change: a 
significant but not unexpected or exceptional development, rather 
 
 34.  See Charlesworth & Larking, supra note 33, at 1. 
 35.  Kenneth Roth, The Pushback Against the Populist Challenge, HUMAN RIGHTS 
WATCH (2018), https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2018/pushback-against-the-populist-
challenge. 
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than a new fundamental system-rejection posture. Successive 
Republican administrations have expressed ambivalence (at best) 
about the Council and its pre-2005 predecessor, the UN Human 
Rights Commission, or at least about the nature and extent of US 
engagement with these institutions.36 Indeed the George W. Bush 
administration voted against the establishment of the Council at all in 
the mid-2000s, on the grounds that it was not a credible body.37 This 
position was one taken by an administration that was overt about US 
support for human rights and freedoms globally. Seen in this context 
it is thus not obvious that the later 2018 withdrawal decision 
represents an outright rejection of international law and international 
legal mechanisms as these relate to human rights. There may well be 
a question of whether withdrawal is an effective tactic of 
international diplomacy or pursuit of national or indeed shared 
international interests. Some have argued that the June 2018 decision 
was not particularly strategic,38 comes with ‘steep costs’39 or a too-
high ‘price’,40 was a ‘self-defeating’ move,41 or a ‘leadership 
mistake.’42 Yet seen in the above historical context it does seem 
rather harder to characterize the withdrawal as a threat to the 
maintenance of a global legal order around human rights, as opposed 
to one approach to that global legal order, upon which opinions will 
differ as to whether engagement and membership are better 
approaches. 
There exists of course a significant caveat to this observation, 
adverted to above. If a superpower disengages from and de-funds the 
Council and does not in fact act on its undertaking to “continue to 
lead on human rights” in the global arena, it is possible to reframe the 
‘continuity and contestation’ narrative as one more resembling the 
 
 36.  See generally Am. J. Int’l L., supra note 6, at 746. 
 37.  Id. 
 38.  See von Borzyskowski & Vabulas, supra note 11, at 344. 
 39.  Steven Feldstein, The Steep Costs of America’s Exit From the U.N. Human Rights 
Council, CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE (June 22, 2018),  
https://carnegieendowment.org/2018/06/22/steep-costs-of-america-s-exit-from-u.n.-human-
rights-council-pub-76676. 
 40.  Sara Silverstein, The Price of America’s Withdrawal from the U.N. Human Rights 
Council: Ignoring Human Rights for Migrants could Mean that Civil Rights are Next, THE 
WASHINGTON POST (July 19, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/made-by-
history/wp/2018/07/19/the-price-of-americas-withdrawal-from-the-u-n-human-rights-
council/. 
 41.  See Piccone, supra note 21, at 1. 
 42.  Michael Posner, Why U.S. Withdrawal from the Human Rights Council is a 
Dangerous Leadership Mistake, FORBES (June 19, 2018, 5:50 PM), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/michaelposner/2018/06/19/u-s-withdrawal-from-the-un-
human-rights-council/#a40f4c0de2ba. 
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existential Type ‘A’ framing. This might be so if we avoid framing 
‘backlash’ as a single event or impact imploding a system, and adopt 
a more nuanced, time-lapse approach whereby systems come under 
threat or are not supported or repaired or reformed or replaced, and a 
legal order falls apart less perceptibly over time.43 If, in addition to its 
Council withdrawal, the US also disengages from and de-funds a 
significant number of non-human rights global institutions on 
everything from oceans governance to trade to peacekeeping, one 
could not continue to examine only the human rights context in 
isolation. 
In this sense, the rules-based international order may be less like 
a ‘fragmented’44 bundle of net international commitments and 
memberships and more like an integrated ecosystem underpinned by 
a single normative commitment. If the US posture on the Council is 
replicated across that ecosystem, and mimicked by allies and enemies 
alike, the Type ‘A’ threat framing might begin to look more like a 
viable scenario. Moreover, the framing of systemic threat might be 
misleading in an ‘all or nothing’ sense. The threatened collapse of a 
legal order might not eventuate and the legal order might survive, yet 
it might be considerably damaged. It might crumble, decay, mutate or 
be appropriated in ways that are deeply problematic in terms of the 
shared goal of ‘more peaceful and inclusive societies’ in the 2030 UN 
Sustainable Development Goals. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Framing exercises such as undertaken here give rise to complex 
and probably insurmountable empirical questions about what might 
really be the causes, proper characterizations, and effects of events 
such as US withdrawal from the Council, or trends such as weakness 
in the UN human rights system. This essay has not attempted such 
empiricism, which is always accompanied by the risk of the blindness 
associated with first framing a problem and then going to look [only] 
for evidence of that problem. The complexity of attempting causation 
or correlation in global affairs should, in particular, suggest a need 
for caution in relation to supposed links between domestic political 
forces and actions or trends in global governance. The ‘pushback’ 
 
 43.  See James Crawford, The Current Political Discourse Concerning International 
Law, 81 THE MOD. L. REV. 1, 21 (2018). 
 44.  See Martti Koskenniemi, Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties Arising 
from the Diversification and Expansion of International Law: Report to the 58th Session of 
the International Law Commission, UN Doc. A/CN.4/L.682 (Apr. 13, 2006). 
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motif reminds us that we must avoid an ‘all or nothing’ frame of 
reference, since it is entirely conceivable that backlash and/or 
backslide on human rights in some geographies or spheres of activity 
might be accompanied by objective advancement of the ‘net’ human 
rights project in others. Moreover, the timeframe for assessing 
impacts might significantly alter one’s assessment of particular 
events. Meanwhile, the framing exercise imports a rather obvious 
normative choice, here to frame system-collapse as ‘negative’ and 
revitalization of the UN architecture as ‘positive’. Concepts such as 
‘backlash’ may obscure that what counts as ‘progress’ or 
‘backsliding’ is likely to be deeply contestable and contested. 
There are winners and losers of globalization, and winners and 
losers of backlash and anti-backlash pushback. There may be upsides, 
in terms of regenerative effects, to serious strains on the rule of law 
and human rights institutions. This is especially so if we are prepared 
to see apathy and complacency (in the West hitherto) as being as big 
a threat to those values and systems as any deliberate sinister attempt 
to undermine them. Finally, one way to conceptualize a ‘backlash’ is 
that it implies a reaction that is expected or foreseeable, explicable, 
understandable or even legitimate, and possibly a response to 
someone or something over-reaching. It may be that academic 
scholars in the intellectual global elite need to be careful about a 
framing that suggests that a regrettable ‘backlash’ phenomenon is 
being driven by certain reactive neo-conservative and/or neo-liberal 
forces, without examining our own complicity in a system that may 
be viewed (rightly or not) variously as patronizing, unresponsive, 
over-promising, or empty-gestured. This is not just to remind us that 
what is dismissed as ‘populist’ may also be ‘popular’ at least in 
majoritarian terms. It is to remind us that we must not just decry 
attacks on the rules-based order from within Western democracies. 
We must also seek to understand how we might have lost the public’s 
support in explaining, more digestibly and persuasively, the 
supposedly ‘universal’ and ‘self-evident’ benefits of that order. 
 
